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What influence does the government have on the outcome of innovation games? During 
the last ten years of rapid industrial progress and globalization, the governments in many 
emerging economies have attempted to actively help the private sector’s innovative efforts. 
For example, Korean government established KOSEF (Korea Science and Engineering 
Foundation) to motivate more innovate activities in a private sector. KOSEF actually runs 
some programs such as Basic Science Programs, National R&D Programs, Nuclear R&D 
programs, Research Promotion Programs, and so on. Chinese government also runs Torch 
program (one National program for science and technology) to establish high-tech 
industrial development areas for more advanced economy. This program is known to 
involve a number of projects in various fields of new technology.  
 
If the government provides better infrastructure or any other type of specialized inputs to 
the firms competing for innovation, does it increase or decrease the firms’ expenditure on 
innovative activities? At first glance, it appears that since provision of better infrastructure 
will increase all firms’ profits at present and in the future, it may not have any incremental 
effect on the firms’ innovative activities. However, in many emerging economies, there is 
substantial uncertainty about completion of government projects because of budget 
problems. Sometimes, a project remains incomplete due to lack of funding. A firm 
investing on innovative activities may find that the government project is completed before 
the firm successfully innovates, in which case its profits before and after innovation both 
will go up. On the other hand, a firm may find that the government project is finished after 
it innovates, thus increasing post-innovation profits.  
 
In this research, we consider innovation games, where two firms are spending money on 
innovative activities. The money spent on innovation affects the probability of success and 
either firm may be the first to innovate. In section 2, the innovation considered is non-
 2
drastic, both firms are incumbent duopolists. The standard innovation race literature 
(Bhattacharya (1986), Reingaum (1981)) examines the nature of dynamic Nash equilibria 
in this game. We consider a modified version of this game where the profits of both firms, 
both pre-and post-innovation may be affected by the successful completion of a 
government project. Our main enquiry is about the effect of the timing of completion of 
the government project on the equilibria of an innovation game. In this model, the firms 
play an innovation game where the probability of success follows a standard stochastic 
process, but the pre- and post-innovation profits are affected by the timing of completion 
of a government project. 
 
After characterizing a dynamic Nash equilibrium for this game, it is shown that both firms’ 
equilibrium expenditure will depend on the probability of completion of the project. It is 
shown that if the probability that the government will complete the project before either 
firm successfully innovates increases, then, in a somewhat paradoxical way, both firms 
will spend smaller amount on innovation because the government sponsored projects 
mainly enhances their duopoly profits. However, it is shown that under certain 
circumstances, the reverse can be true, i.e., a higher probability of completion of the 
government project will inspire innovative activities of both firms. Therefore, government 
sponsored projects that provide infrastructure or specialized inputs to innovating firms may 
inspire the level of innovative activities even though the success of government-projects 
mainly improve their duopoly profits rather than monopoly profits. The intuitive reasoning 
behind this result is as follows: Under uncertainty of a completion of the government-
sponsored projects, the average of monopoly profits might increase for both firms. Thus, it 
could happen that firms competitively increase their R&D expenditures to win the 
innovation game.    
 
In section 3, the same innovation game is considered for a drastic innovation (Gilbert and 
Newberry (1982)), where one firm is and incumbent and has a pre-innovation monopoly. 
The entrant firm has no pre-innovation profits, but will replace the incumbent if it 
innovates first. The conclusion obtained here is that a higher probability of completion of 
the government’s project will increase the incumbent firm’s innovative expenditure more 
than the entrant’s expenditure. This result implies that government support can actually 
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lead to a higher degree of persistence of monopoly in emerging economies. The intuition 
behind the result is as follows: The entrant spends more R&D expenditure than the 
incumbent. The uncertainty of a completion of government-sponsored projects makes both 
firms to increase their expenditure when the probability of completion of the government’s 
project increases because the average of post-innovation monopoly profits would increases 
for both firms. In fact, the incumbent increases expenditure more than the entrant since the 





In this section, both firms are incumbent duopolists, and any innovation from either side 
will eventually change the duopoly into a monopoly.  
 
The government-sponsored projects 
 
A public sector and a private sector seem to be vertically-structured in some aspects 
because many private companies are provided a supportive service from a government. For 
example, a professional research base is commonly found in most nations and many 
private firms actually do their R&D works in that base. In this context, one government 
has projects to provide better infrastructure or any other type of specialized inputs for 
private firms. There are two ways by which the government project is completed. First, the 
project is completed before a private firm innovates. Second, the project is completed after 
a private firm innovates. The first case mainly enhances both firms’ duopoly profits and 
also monopoly profits. The second case improves only the monopoly profits for both firms. 
Thus, both firms play an innovation game in which they strategically invest on R&D 
projects for their futures. For example, many governments support the Nanotechnology 
project or have a grand plan to provide the better infrastructure for the project that would 




A. The government’s project is completed before a private firm 
innovates 
 
The government’s innovation or other beneficial upstream projects will shift private firms’ 
duopoly profits. The enhanced duopoly profits improve private firms’ competence so an 
instant monopoly profit would also be increased when they actually innovate themselves. 
Both private firms invest on R&D to bring an innovation earlier by their own hands. As 
they spend some money on R&D, the timing of innovation would be faster because their 
innovation occurrences are exponentially distributed, and their instant success rates depend 
on the R&D expenditures.  
 
Formally, ifb is Firm B’s instantaneous R&D spending, then the instant success rate for 
innovation u  is ( )bβ . The time of occurrence of u  is denoted as uτ , which is 
exponentially distributed with a density function. 
 
( )( ) ( ) ubu u b e
β τψ τ β −= ,  0 uτ< < ∞  
 
Similarly, if Firm C spends c  as an instantaneous investment on R&D, then the instant 
success rate for innovation n  is ( )cγ . The arrival timing of n  is denoted as nτ , which 
is exponentially distributed with a density function. 
 
( )( ) ( ) ncn n c e





An innovation race terminates in this final stage by either private firm’s success. It means 
that both firms actually stop spending for R&D projects. If a firm succeeds in an 
innovation then a firm would gain a monopoly profit because of its overall dominance over 
the market. However, the rival would gains no more profit in this market. Depending on 
the result of the innovation race, a firm’s instant profit should be either a monopoly profit 
 5
or zero by the new technology that can dominate over the market. There are two different 
final stages.  
 
(1) Final Stage 1d  
 
In this stage, Firm B successfully innovates so the innovation race is finished because both 
firms would cease further spending on R&D. In this case, Firm B acquires a patent by an 
innovation and becomes a monopolist. The rival (Firm C) gives up its R&D projects. Thus, 
no private firm needs to spend R&D expenditure any more. Both firms’ Nash Equilibrium 
strategies are to choose zero R&D expenditure in this stage. The instant profit vector 
is ( )1( ), 0B d +Ω . From the timing of an innovation, the final stage begins and the expected 






[ ( )]d rtB
B d
H e B d dt
r
∞
− + Ω= +Ω =∫  
1
0
[0] 0d rtCH e dt
∞
−= =∫  
 
(2) Final Stage 2d  
 
When the other private firm, Firm C, accomplishes an innovation and monopolizes all 
market shares by using the technological advance, the rival firm (Firm B) has nothing to 
gain in this market. Accordingly, the profit vector becomes 2(0, ( ))C d +Ω . At this stage, 




[0] 0d rtBH e dt
∞





[ ( )]d rtC
C d
H e C d dt
r
∞





Different from final stages, both firms’ Nash Equilibrium R&D strategies are not zero in a 
Non-Final Stage. They continue to spend money on R&D for an innovation as early as 
possible. This stage goes on unless either firm declares a success of an innovation.  
 
(1) The Initial Stage 
 
In this stage, no firm achieves an innovation and both participants make their efforts to 
develop the new technology for their own sakes. This Initial Stage will last until either 
Firm B or Firm C succeeds in an innovation, and the stage turns into a final stage in which 
the firms stop R&D investment. There are two final stages that would occur by the first-
innovator. The timing that either final stage arrives is randomly determined by exponential 
distribution. The instant profit vector is ( )0 0,B C+Ω +Ω . At this Initial Stage, the expected 
discounted total profits for both firms are as follows. 
 
The probability that no firms have succeeded in innovation until time τ , and Firm B has 
its own innovation u  at time τ  is 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) Pr , Pr Pru u n u nob d ob d obψ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ= < < + > = < < + ⋅ >  
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( )( ) ( )Pr 1 Pr ( ) 1 1 ( ) b cb cu nob d ob b e e b e β γ τβ τ γ ττ τ τ τ τ τ β β − +− −= < < + ⋅ − ≤ = − − =⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
 
Similarly, the probability that no firms have succeeded in innovation until time τ , and 
Firm C has its own innovation n  at time τ is 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) Pr , Pr Prn n u n uob d ob d obψ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ= < < + > = < < + ⋅ >  
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( )( ) ( )Pr 1 Pr ( ) 1 1 ( ) c bc bn uob d ob c e e c e γ β τγ τ β ττ τ τ τ τ τ γ γ − +− −= < < + ⋅ − ≤ = − − =⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
 
An innovation happens at time τ  by either Firm B or Firm C. Intuitively speaking, Firm 
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B can calculate its expected discounted profit under the possibility of its own innovation, 
and under the possibility of its rival firm’s innovation. The sum of those two expected 
discounted profits under both cases represents Firm B’s real expected discounted profit in 
the Initial Stage. If Firm B’s expectation is formalized then it can be shown as below.   
 
( ) ( )0 0 10 0 ( ) ( )rt rtB uH e B b dt e B d dt dτ τ ψ τ τ∞ ∞− −= +Ω − + +Ω∫ ∫ ∫⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
                  + ( ) ( )00 0 0 ( )
rt rt




∞ ∞− −+ Ω −⎡ ⎤+⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ ∫  
 
From the function above, it seems that Firm B’s instant profits should be discounted first 
and those discounted profits are actually expected. In discounting, the randomly distributed 
timing of innovation plays an important role as below.  
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 10
0 0
( )
( ) ( )1 b c b cr rB
B b B d
e b e d e b e d
r r
H β γ τ β γ ττ τβ τ β τ
∞ ∞
− + − +− −+ Ω − +Ω−
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∫ ∫
                               
 
+
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0
00
( ) 0 ( )1 c b c br
B b
e c e d c e d
r
γ β τ γ β ττ γ τ γ τ
∞ ∞− + − +−+ Ω −
∫
⎡ ⎤
⎡ ⎤− +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎣ ⎦
∫               
 
First of all, all integrals can be found by the random variableτ , which actually represents 
the timing of innovation. Then, Firm B’s expected discounted profit function entirely 
depends on the random variableτ . Because of the probability densities, the function above 
can be simplified as follows, and it should be a function of two different success rates. In 
this case, the success rates are not constant. They actually change with the R&D 
expenditures. The changing success rates provide the main reason why private firms join 





[ ] [ ]0 0( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
B b B b
b b
r r
b c r b c
β β
β γ β γ
+Ω − +Ω −
−
+ + +
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
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⎣ ⎦  
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[ ] [ ]0 0( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
B b B b
c c
r r
b c r b c
γ γ
β γ β γ
+ Ω − +Ω −
−
+ + +
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥











0[ ] ( )
( ) ( )




+ Ω − +
+ +









Intuitively, Firm B’s simplified profit informs that an overall expected profit should be 
discounted by the new discount factor[ ]1 ( ) ( )r b cβ γ+ + + rather than[ ]1 r+ . That is, the 
randomly distributed timing of innovation induces an overall expectation over an instant 
profit 0[ ]B b+Ω− and the obtained discounted profit from a final stage 1[ ]
d
BH , and 
eventually discounts an overall expected profit by the new discount factor.  
 
Firm C can expect its discounted profit as similar as Firm B. That is, its expected 
discounted profit can be calculated under both cases, the possibility of its own innovation 
and the possibility of its rival’s innovation.  
 
( ) ( )0 0 20 0 ( ) ( )
rt rt




∞ ∞− −+ Ω − +Ω⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ ∫  
                  + ( ) ( )00 0 0 ( )
rt rt




∞ ∞− −+ Ω − +⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ ∫  
 
By integrating, Firm C’s expected discounted profit function depends on the random 
variable τ  as below.  
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[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 20
0 0
( )
( ) ( )1 c b c br rC
C c C d
H e c e d e c e d
r r
γ β τ γ β ττ τγ τ γ τ
∞ ∞
− + − +− −+ Ω − +Ω+ −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∫ ∫
                 
                
+
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0
0 0
1 ( ) 0 ( )b c b cr
C c
e b e d b e d
r
β γ τ β γ ττ β τ β τ
∞ ∞
− + − +−+ Ω − − +
⎡ ⎤
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎣ ⎦
∫ ∫  
 




[ ] [ ]0 0( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
C c C c
c c
r r
b c r b c
γ γ
β γ β γ
+ Ω − +Ω −
−
+ + +
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥





[ ]2( ) ( )











⎣ ⎦  
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[ ] [ ]0 0( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
C c C c
b b
r r
b c r b c
β β
β γ β γ
+Ω − +Ω −
−
+ + +
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥






The obtained expected value above is simplified as follows.  
 
2
0 0[ ] ( )[ ]









+ Ω − +
=
+ +









The two expected forms of profit functions show that, by the innovation game, each firm’s 
instant profit in the Initial Stage eventually evolves into the profit of either final stage by 
the success rate. In fact, this innovation race is a huge sequential game in which both 
participants play by R&D expenditure under an infinite horizon. Furthermore, the entire 
game has two sub-stages by an innovation, which randomly occurs from the competition 
between two firms. For each sub-stage, a discounted profit can be obtained. Since it is 
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already known that both firms would not spend any R&D expenditure in either final stage, 
a huge sequential game can be reduced to the Initial Stage in which both firms still spend 
the R&D expenditure for their own innovations. By using discounted profits from both 
final stages, the profit functions for both firms can be derived as 0BH  and 
0
CH , and Nash 
Equilibrium ( )* *,b c  can be found in the reduced game.  
 
A Nash equilibrium can be obtained in the Initial Stage because both firms try to maximize 
their expected discounted profit functions.  
 








, a best response function is found such as 









. From two conditions above, a Nash equilibrium is derived as 
( , )N Nb c .  
 
By deriving the Nash equilibrium, the backward induction is complete. The derived Nash 
equilibrium implies that the private firms determine the levels of the R&D expenditure 
when the innovation race begins, and their choices remain the same levels during the 
Initial Stage. The firms’ R&D expenditures of the Initial Stage affect an arrival of an 
innovation, and the timing of sub-stage is actually determined.  
 



















⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦=   
 





















⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦   
 
B. The government’s project is completed after a firm innovates 
 
Unlike the previous case for mainly enhancing the private firms’ duopoly profits, this case 
entirely focuses on improving the monopoly profit. That is, the first innovator will be 




(1) Final Stage 1d  
 
In this stage, Firm B succeeds in an innovation so the innovation game actually has a sub-
stage by Firm B’s innovation. The entire sequential game possibly has one final stage but 
the timing of the final stage is unknown due to randomness of innovation. As explained 
before, there are two final stages. Here, Firm B innovates and turns to be a monopolist by 
its patent right. Accordingly, the rival firm (Firm C) abandons its investment on R&D 
project. Thus, both firms stop spending for R&D. Firm B already achieved its goal, and 
Firm C finds no meaning to spend more on the R&D project. That is, the Nash equilibrium 
strategy for both firms is to spend nothing for R&D in this stage. An instant profit vector 







[ ( ) ]
( )[ ]d rtB
B d





− ++ == ∫  
1
0
[0] 0d rtCH e dt
∞
− == ∫  
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(2) Final Stage 2d  
 
This stage represents that other private firm (Firm C) accomplishes an innovation and 
eventually possess an exclusive patent right. So, the innovating Firm C becomes a 
monopolist to roll over all market shares by the technological advantage in the market. 
Meanwhile, the rival firm (Firm B) gains nothing by the technological disadvantage. 
Accordingly, the profit vector is much favorable to Firm C such as 2(0, ( ) )C d δ+ . At this 




[0] 0d rtBH e dt
∞




[ ( ) ]
[ ( ) ]d rtC
C d










(1) The Initial Stage 
 
As explained before, both firms make their efforts to be the first-innovator for the 
monopoly profit when no firm has achieved an innovation yet. The Initial Stage will 
remain until either Firm B or Firm C succeeds in an innovation, and the stage turns into 
another stage, Stage 1d or Stage 2d . In this stage, an instant profit vector is ( )0 0,B C . The 
total expected discounted profit for both firms can be obtained in the same way as before.  
 
Intuitively, Firm B separately calculates its expected discounted profits under either its 




( ) ( )0 0 10 0 ( ) ( )
rt rt
B uH e B b dt e B d dt d
τ
τ
δ ψ τ τ
∞ ∞− −− + +⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ ∫  
                  + ( ) ( )00 0 0 ( )
rt rt




∞ ∞− −− +⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ ∫  
 
where [ ]( ) ( )( ) ( ) b cu b e
β γ τψ τ β − += and [ ]( ) ( )( ) ( ) c bn c e
γ β τψ τ γ − +=  
 
Firm B’s entire expectation is eventually simplified as follows.  
 
1
0 0[ ] ( )
( ) ( )
[ ]dB
B








 where 1 1









Firm C also finds its expected discounted profit in a similar way as Firm B.  
 
( ) ( )0 0 20 0 ( ) ( )
rt rt
C nH e C c dt e C d dt d
τ
τ
δ ψ τ τ
∞ ∞− −= − + +⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ ∫  
                  + ( ) ( )00 0 0 ( )
rt rt




∞ ∞− −− +⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ ∫  
 
where [ ]( ) ( )( ) ( ) b cu b e
β γ τψ τ β − += and [ ]( ) ( )( ) ( ) c bn c e
γ β τψ τ γ − +=  
 
By expectation, Firm C’s profit is simplified as a function, depending on two different 
success rates.  
 
2
0 0[ ] ( )
( ) ( )
[ ]dC
C







=  where 2 2








As similar as the previous case, a Nash equilibrium will be found in this Initial stage 
because one firm maximizes its expected discounted profit function while the other firm 
maximizes in the same manner.  
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, a best response function is derived such as 










From two conditions above, a Nash equilibrium is derived as ( , )N Nb c . The derived Nash 
equilibrium supports the completion of backward induction since the entire innovation 
game was reduced to the Initial Stage. As explained before, the innovation race is a huge 
sequential game under an infinite horizon, and an innovation randomly occurs. That is, no 
one knows when an innovation may realize, and, as soon as either firm succeeds in 
innovating, the stage changes into a final stage in which firms stop spending for R&D. The 
fact that an arrival of a final stage depends on the randomly distributed variableτ requires 
the new form of discount factor[ ]1 ( ) ( )r b cβ γ+ + + , constituting of two success rates. 
The equilibrium expected total discounted profits for both firms are as follows.  
 





















⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦   
 





















⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦   
 
Uncertainty of the government-sponsored projects 
 
As discussed, the government’s project can be completed either before or after a firm 
innovates. A completion of the government’s project before a private innovation mainly 
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enhances duopoly profits. It also affects both firms’ potential discounted monopoly profits 
in the final stage. Meanwhile, a completion after a private innovation provides the firms 
the specially enhanced monopoly profits. However, a private firm does not know when a 
completion might happen. Let 1π  denote the probability of a completion before a private 
innovation, and similarly, 2π  denotes the probability of a completion after a private 
innovation. Both firms can average the derived expected profits over two states and find 
the overall expected profits.  
 
Sometimes, a completion of the government project is not guaranteed because of budget 
problems even though the government makes all efforts. So, private firms face two 
situations. First, the government makes sure that the project will be complete either before 
or after a private innovation. Second, the government does not make sure a completion of 
the project despite its all efforts. The implication is that the government may not be 
responsible for uncertain circumstances such as unexpected costs behind the project. 
Usually, financing a public project is limited due to the constrained budget. In the case that 
the government has the difficulty to raise additional funds, the government’ project might 
make no progress and remain incomplete.   
 
 
1) Certainty case ( 1 2 1π π+ = ) 
 
In this case, the government’s project must be completed either before or after a private 
innovation. That is, the government makes firms sure that a supportive innovation will 
happen despite some restrictive situations such as budget problems. A completion of the 
project may require much expenditure however the government guarantees a private sector 
a completion of the project. Thus, private firms can calculate their overall expected profits. 
Both firms’ overall expected profits are following.  
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In the situation that each firm averages the expected profit functions over two states, the 
Nash equilibrium can be found because each still tries to maximize its calculated overall 
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The R&D expenditure, as a firm’s strategy in the innovation game, should be at least as 
well as zero. The Nash equilibrium strategy promises the greatest profit at the opponent’s 
given strategy. Thus, each firm can take a derivative the overall expected profit with 
respect to its own strategy.  
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In a similar manner, the opponent maximizes its overall expected profit.  
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Let X denote 
1
2b , and let Y denote 
1
2c .  
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Since the firms, as the incumbent duopolists, have equal market shares under the same 
circumstances in the industry, the market profits should be equally distributed to both firms. 
Furthermore, the potential monopoly profit in a final stage would be the same for both 
firms because they target the same type of technological improvement through R&D 
project. Then, the symmetry condition can be derived from (1)’ and (2)’ because the 
duopoly profits and the potential monopoly profits are identical for both firms. The 
symmetric condition actually implies that one firm chooses its R&D expenditure based on 
the expectation that its opponent would make the same choice under all the same 
circumstances.  
 
Under a symmetry condition ( X Y= ), Firm B chooses its Nash Equilibrium R&D 
expenditure from the following equation.  
 
( )2 * * 0 13 2 ( ) ( ) 0B BX r H X H r B π+ − − − + Ω =⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  where 0 0B C= , 
* *
B CH H=  
 
The equation above implies that Firm B still needs to find the profit-maximizing R&D 
choice from the clue that Firm C would actually choose the same as Firm B. In the 
opposite way, Firm C obtains the profit-maximizing R&D choice by the same speculation. 
The symmetric condition simply tells that both firms provide a clue for each other and they 
equally reach the Nash Equilibrium.  
 
2* * *
0 1( ) 2 2 ( ) 12 ( ) ( )
6
B B BH r r H H r B
X Y
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( ),b c′ ′  is the Nash Equilibrium. As both firms expect, they actually obtain the same 
equilibrium R&D choices.  
 
The government tries to figure out whether the public projects have an effect on the 
innovative activities of private firms. First of all, the government aims in inspiring 
innovative activities. The government still has a question if any increased probability of a 
completion of the project before a private innovation has an impact on innovative activities. 
To see what effects the increased probability ( 1π ) would bring in the industry, a 
comparative study is suggested for 1π  and the Nash Equilibrium R&D expenditures. 
Depending on the size of 1π , the Nash Equilibrium R&D expenditures of both firms 
would change. If we actually take a derivative X ′  with respect to 1π  then the following 
result is obtained.  
 
1* * *2 2* * *
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1 1 1 1




dH dH dHdX r H H r B r H r
d d d d
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π π π π




* ( ) ( )
0B






⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
















The inequality above tells that a raised probability for a completion of the project actually 
reduces the R&D expenditures for both firms. The implication is that as the government 
tries harder to complete the project before a private innovation both private firms are not 
so motivated for their innovative activities because a completed government-project 
 20
mainly enhances both firms’ duopoly profits. More intuitively, the increased probability 




CH ) of discounted monopoly profits. The direct 
reason is that an increase in 1π  necessarily implies a decrease in 2π  under certainty. It 
means that an increased chance in one state reduces the chance of the other state. 
Unfortunately, both firms can expect higher monopoly profits at 2π  than at 1π . Thus, 
private firms’ average of (discounted) monopoly profit would be decreased as 1π  
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Meanwhile, both firms’ averages ( Ω+− 10 πbB  and Ω+− 10 πcC ) of duopoly profits 




2) Uncertainty case ( 1 2 1π π+ < , where  10 1π≤ <   and 20 1π≤ < ) 
 
This case represents that the government-project might not be completed for private firms 
due to some reasons, different from the certainty case. In a private sector, firms would 
calculate their overall expected profits under uncertainty by averaging both states as 
follows. Both firms’ overall expected profits are following.  
 
 21
Firm B’s overall expected total discounted profit is 
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Firm C’s overall expected total discounted profit is 
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Firm B tries to find its best R&D choice. So, the firm takes a derivative with respect to its 
own R&D expenditure and has the following first order conditions, which represents that 
Firm B actually finds a Nash Equilibrium at a given rival firm’s R&D choice.  
 22
 
[ ] [ ]( )
1 1 1 1 1
* *2 2 2 2 2













π π π π π
− −












( ) ( )
B







⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
 
In a similar manner, the opponent maximizes its overall expected profit by the first order 
condition.  
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From the two first order conditions, the new necessary conditions for both firms’ overall 
expected profits are found as follows since
1 1
2 2 0r b c+ + ≠ .  
 
 
[ ] [ ]( )
1 1 1 1 1
* *2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 0 1
1 1 1
2 2 2
1 ( ) 0B Br b c b H r B b c Hπ π π π π
− −
− + + − − + − + + Ω + =




[ ] [ ]( )
1 1 1 1 1
1 1* *2 2 2 2 2




1 ( ) 0C Cr c b c H r C c b Hπ π π π π
− −
− + + − − + − + + Ω + =





Let X denote 
1
2b , and let Y denote 
1
2c  for simplicity.  
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As similar as the certainty case, both firms would choose their R&D expenditures by 
expectation that the rival would determine its choice based on the same expectation since 
both firms make their decisions under identical circumstances. They would reach a 
symmetric equilibrium R&D choice. Under a symmetry condition, Firm B has the new 
condition for maximizing its overall expected profit as follows. The simplified form 
implies that Firm B narrows its choices by a clue that its rival Firm C would choose the 
same as itself.  
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Both Firm B and Firm C actually choose the same R&D expenditure by the same 
expectation toward its rival’s strategic behavior. The expectation actually leads to the 
symmetric result.  
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( ),b c′ ′ is the Nash Equilibrium. 
If the government enlarges the budget for the public project and increases the probability 
of a completion, how do private firms respond to this favorable government’s support? Do 
they increase or decrease their innovative activities? 
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greater than or equal to zero then the private firms’ R&D choices would increase in 1π . 
Implicatively, the private firms may spend more expenditure for R&D, under uncertainty, 
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Rearrange all the terms by 1π  and 2π . 
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The following conditions actually satisfy the inequality above since 1 0π ≥ and 2 0π ≥ .  
 
(1) 21 5 / 2( ) rB d ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦+ Ω ≥  
(2) ( )( ) [ ] [ ]21 1 1 1/ 2( ) ( ) 4 ( ) ( )rB d B d B d B dδ δ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦+ + Ω ≥ + + + Ω⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
(3) ( ) ( )1 04 / 3( )B d B+ Ω ≥ + Ω  
 
Actually, the conditions above can be simplified. First, if ( ) ( )2 05 / 2 4 / 3r B⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ≥ + Ω then the 
intersection between (1) and (3) should be 25 / 2( )1 rB d
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦+ Ω ≥ . In this case, we can 
conclude that ( ) ( )08/15r B≤ − + Ω  or ( ) ( )08/15r B≥ + Ω . In fact, ( ) ( )08/15r B≥ + Ω  
since 0 1r< < . ( )0B + Ω should be less than ( )15/8 .  
 
Second, if ( ) ( )2 05 / 2 4 /3r B⎡ ⎤ ≤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ + Ω then the intersection between (1) and (3) will be 
( ) ( )1 04 / 3( )B d B+ Ω ≥ + Ω . So, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 08/15 8/15B r B− + Ω ≤ ≤ + Ω . r actually takes 
 26
some value between 0 and ( ) ( )08/15 B + Ω  since 0 1r≤ < .  
 
If ( )0B + Ω is at least as great as ( )15/8  then the imposed constraint 
( ) ( )2 05 / 2 4 /3r B⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ≥ + Ω is meaningless in this argument and the three conditions above 
should be reduced to the following two conditions, 
( )( ) [ ] [ ]21 1 1 1/ 2( ) ( ) 4 ( ) ( )rB d B d B d B dδ δ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦+ + Ω ≥ + + + Ω⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦   
and ( ) ( )1 04 / 3( )B d B+ Ω ≥ + Ω .  
 
So far, we have discussed under what cases the private firms may increase their R&D 
expenditures though their enhanced duopoly profits by a completion of the government-
project.  
 
Under certainty case, an increased funding for completing the project reduces R&D 
expenditures of the private firms. In fact, an increased probability ( 1π ) of completion of 
the project improves the firms’ averages of duopoly profits but reduces averages of 
(discounted) monopoly profits for both firms. It results from the fact that an increased 
probability of one state necessarily means a reduction of probability of the other state 
under certainty case. Due to the reduced averages of monopoly profits and the improved 
averages of duopoly profits, the firms would lower their levels of R&D expenditures. 
However, both the averages of duopoly profits and the averages of monopoly profits 
improve under uncertainty case when 1π  increases. Unlike the certainty case, the 
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The averages of monopoly profits would make the firms confused about their R&D 
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decisions. That is, the firms would be willing to reduce their R&D spending by the 
improved averages of duopoly profits and be ready to increase the R&D spending for the 
improved averages of monopoly profits. In this case, the firms may increase or decrease 
their R&D expenditures, depending on the situation. If an increase in 1π  more strongly 
impacts the averages of duopoly profits then the private firms would be less motivated for 
an innovation so their R&D expenditures would be decreased. On the contrary, if the 
increased 1π  more strongly impacts the averages of monopoly profits then they would be 
more motivated to innovate earlier. Thus, their R&D expenditures would be increased.  
 
Intuitively, the uncertainty makes both firms to remind that they are involved in an 
innovation race for their future. Thus, if the government increases the fund to complete the 
project and enhances the duopoly profits under uncertainty then both firms might increase 
their R&D expenditures, in some cases, for their monopoly profits in the future. 
Implicatively, they are forced to spend more for their innovative activities under 




Unlike the previous case that both firms equally share the market, this innovation race 
starts by a monopoly and ends up with a monopoly. In detail, the incumbent firm has a 
monopoly profit before the entrant firm succeeds in an innovation. The entrant’s 
innovation would actually replace a monopolist. However, the entrant would gain nothing 
until it successfully innovates through its continuous R&D expenditure. Up to the timing 
of any innovation, the incumbent firm still obtains its monopoly profit. With its own 
innovation, the incumbent firm improves its monopoly profit. With the entrant’s innovation, 
the incumbent firm will be replaced for good by the entrant firm. For example, a medicine 
represents the drastic innovation well. Usually, a newly-invented medicine monopolizes all 
market shares and is replaced by the new medicine that has smaller side effect. In this way, 
a medicine evolves to the smallest side effect (Obesity, Anti-depression, and so on). The 
pharmacy industry is closely related with the government project because of a lot of R&D 
costs.   
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Here, Firm B is the incumbent firm and Firm C is the entrant firm. Both firms’ overall 
expected profits are following.  
 
Firm B’s overall expected total discounted profit is 
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Firm B’s overall expected total discounted profit is 
 
[ ] [ ]2 2
0
1 2
( ) ( )
0 ( ) 0 ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )C
C d C d
c c c c
r rH




β γ β γ
+Ω +
− + − +
′ = +
+ + + +
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥





2( )b bβ = , 
1









( ) ( )
B






π π π π π
+Ω +
Ω+ + − + +
′ =
+ +
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤













( ) ( )
0
C






π π π π
+Ω +
+ − + +
′ =
+ +
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤







From the first order conditions,  
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By comparative static analysis, we can recognize how private firms would respond to the 
government’s favorable policy such as enlarging the budget for the public project and 
increasing the probability of a completion of the public project. By total differentiation, 
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By transformation, the equations (3) and (4) can be rewritten as (3)’ and (4)’.  
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As explained for the non-drastic case, an increased probability of a completion of the 
project would improve the averages of post-innovation monopoly profits under uncertainty. 
Intuitively, the entrant would increase its R&D expenditure when the government enlarges 
the budget for completing the public projects because the entrant has spent more on R&D 
to challenge the entire market. Both firms’ discounted post-innovation monopoly profits 
are reasonably assumed to be the same in the final stage.  
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Implicatively, an increased probability of a completion of project would increase both the 
average of pre-innovation monopoly profit and the average of post-innovation monopoly 
profit for the incumbent. The incumbent would decrease its R&D expenditure by an 
increase in the average of pre-innovation monopoly profit however the firm would 
increase its R&D expenditure by an increase in the average of post-innovation monopoly 
profit. In this situation, if the increased probability impacts the average of post-innovation 
more strongly than the average of pre-innovation then the incumbent increases its R&D 
expenditure.  
 
From above, both firms would respond to the government’s enlarging budget for a 
completion by increasing their R&D expenditures. Then, which firm would increase more 
R&D expenditure than the other? That is, is it the incumbent or the entrant that would be 
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The incumbent firm should be more responsive to the increased probability of a 
completion of the project than the entrant. Implicatively, if the government enlarges the 
budget for completing the public projects under uncertainty, the averages of post-
innovation monopoly profits improve for both firms. Here, as the entrant spends larger 
R&D expenditure and intimidates the incumbent, the incumbent’s concern for the future 
grows. So the incumbent should sensitively respond to any change in circumstances such 
as an increased probability of a completion of the public projects, which could be 
favorable to its own R&D project. Thus, the incumbent increases its R&D spending more 




We have discussed how the government project actually inspires innovative activities in a 
private sector for two different cases, a standard case and a drastic case. The main result is 
that if the probability of a completion of the government-project increases then both firms’ 
R&D expenditures will decrease. Implicatively, in the case that the government raises the 
budget for a completion of the project, both firms find that their duopoly profits seem to be 
enhanced more than their monopoly profits so they would lose their motivation for 
innovative activities. However, we could find some different results under the uncertainty 
case. That is, if the government does not make sure a completion of the project then a 
raised probability of a completion does not necessarily reduce the R&D expenditures in a 
private sector. An implication is as follows. Because a raised probability would increase 
both the averages of duopoly profits and the averages of monopoly profits in the future, 
both firms are confused about their R&D choices. Different from the certainty case, the 
uncertainty reminds the firms that they are involved in the innovation race for acquiring 
the monopoly profit at their future so both firms may increase their R&D expenditure for 
earlier innovation. In this case, they are actually forced for more innovative activities 
although a completion of the government-project implies their enhanced duopoly profits 
rather than their potential monopoly profits.  
 
For a drastic case in which the entrant would replace the incumbent when the entrant 
succeeds in innovation, we also found the similar result. Under the situation that the 
government does not make sure a completion of the government-sponsored project, both 
firms may increase their R&D spending for innovation when the probability of a 
completion of government project is raised. In fact, the raised probability of a completion 
increases the average of post-innovation monopoly profit for the entrant so the entrant 
would increase its R&D expenditure. The raised probability of a completion also improves 
the average of pre-innovation monopoly profit and the average of post-innovation 
monopoly profit for the incumbent. The incumbent would decrease its R&D expenditure 
by an increase in the average of pre-innovation monopoly profit and would increase its 
R&D expenditure by an increase in the average of post-innovation monopoly profit. If the 
increased probability impacts the average of post-innovation more strongly than the 
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average of pre-innovation then the incumbent increases its R&D expenditure.  
 
The situation that the entrant spends larger R&D expenditure makes the incumbent 
concern about its future. The point is that the incumbent increases its R&D expenditure 
more than the entrant. The incumbent seems more responsive to any change in its research 
infrastructure because the entrant consistently challenges the entire market by larger R&D 
spending, and any favorable change, from research infrastructure, makes a positive impact 
on its post-innovation monopoly profit in the future. In this context, the incumbent is never 
less motivated for innovative activities than the entrant under uncertainty. In another word, 
if the entrant is no more motivated than the incumbent then it seems hard that the entrant 
can replace the incumbent. That is why a persistent monopoly could be found in emerging 
economies.  
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In the major league, the highest payroll team spends for employing players almost ten 
times larger than the lowest payroll team. However, the size of team payroll does not 
necessarily represent winning rate or well-performance in a tournament of fall classic. 
Surprisingly, some financially small-sized teams often advance to championship series. 
For example, only Boston was the only leading high-payroll team among the four teams 
(American league - Boston and Cleveland, National league – Colorado and Arizona) that joined the 
championship series in the last 2007. In detail, Boston and Cleveland ranked the 2nd and 
the 24th out of 31 teams, respectively. The National league rivals, Colorado and Arizona 
ranked the 26th and the 27th for each.  
 
Interestingly, there has been an argument that directly relates a team performance to a 
team’s overall salary. Recently, Hakes and Sauer (2006) found the main reason of low 
winning rates in high-payroll team from a ‘mis-pricing’. With empirical findings, they 
insisted that many baseball players have been actually ‘mis-priced’. The main point was 
that the on-base percentage contributes more to improve a team’s winning rate than the 
slugging percentage but, in most cases, the owners do not pay much attention on the on-
base percentage.  
 
Why does not the team’s payroll represent the team’s performance well? This paper finds a 
reason of this ‘unbalanced payroll and performance’ from ‘Overemphasis’ of homeruns. 
Usually, a homerun contributes much to increase a total base in each game and also helps 
ballgame become more excited. However, the overemphasis of homerun may lead to larger 
uncertainty of expected total base. To discuss the overemphasis problem, we need to define 
two different ‘playing spirits’ such as ‘Egoism (Self-discipline)’ and ‘Altruism’ and 
theoretically explain how an owner implements different types of hitters, expensive hitters 
and inexpensive hitters. Expensive hitters could have larger expected total bases at 
‘Egoism’ than at ‘Altruism’ so an owner implements ‘Egoism (Self-discipline)’ from 
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expensive hitters in section 2. In fact, implementing ‘Egoism’ increases an expected total 
bases and also increases the uncertainty of total base itself because hitters would focus on 
bigger hits and necessarily raise the probability of ‘Out’. Meanwhile, ‘Altruism’ is 
implemented from inexpensive hitters because they have larger expected total bases at 
‘Altruism’ than at ‘Egoism’. Overall, expensive hitters have larger expected total base and 
larger uncertainty at ‘Egoism’ than inexpensive hitters at ‘Altruism’.  
 
 In ‘Egoism’, a homerun, among other hits, is mostly emphasized by an owner because of 
its contribution to increase total base and to attract more fans. The empirical result 
supports that the number of homerun actually plays a major role in determining sluggers’ 
salaries. In section 3, it will be shown that the over-emphasis of the biggest hit causes a 
concept of ‘opportunity cost’ in producing the relatively smaller hit such as a triple, a 
double, and a single. Due to ‘opportunity cost’, the order of preference could be changed. 
Any changed order between smaller hits ironically verifies that a homerun is over-
emphasized. According to the empirical finding from 2SLS estimation, a double seems to 
be interestingly preferred to a triple.  
 
A homerun acquires four bases, which is the largest among available hits. It would help 
increase the expected total base however substantially increases the uncertainty of total 
base since the probability of ‘Out’ also increases. In summary, owners do not count larger 
uncertainty but concentrates only on larger expected total bases. No concern about larger 
uncertainty seems to be directly related with ‘unbalanced team’s payroll and team’s 
performance’. Overall, this paper is constituted of two parts, a theoretic description and an 
empirical study. The theory part shows that an expensive hitter necessarily swings hard due 
to an incentive scheme imposed on his salary contract. In the empirical part, all types of 




A. Salary Contract for a hitter 
 
An owner has to determine his player’s salary without observing efforts in making a 
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contract. A salary-negotiation would happen before a season so an owner faces a risk of his 
player’s hidden action during a pennant race. To avoid any hidden action, an incentive 
scheme is needed from an owner’s perspective. First of all, a hitter’s salary is distributed 
based on the number of total bases that provide a good approximation for how a hitter 
contributes to win. A team’s revenue is assumed to increase by improved winning rate. A 
total base can be mainly produced by two types of hits, a single and a bigger hit including 
a homerun, a triple, and a double. A single and a bigger hit are random outputs, and they 
have some probability densities. Depending on a hitter’s effort, the densities would be 
raised. An owner makes a contract by expecting a hitter’s total base. There are two 
different playing spirits, ‘Altruism’ and ‘Egoism (Self-discipline)’ by which a player 
contributes to win a game in some ways. In ‘Altruism’, a hitter plays for his organization 
so he tries to make a timely hit for a run. Due to a light and a precise swing, a probability 
of single is larger, and a probability of Out is smaller. In ‘Egoism’, a hitter swings hard 
with personal ambition so a probability of a big hit is larger. However, a probability of Out 
is also larger.  
 
Different from other sports such as soccer, basketball, and football, an owner can not 
observe under what spirit a hitter plays. An owner actually implements a state of 
‘Altruism’ for inexpensive hitters and a state of ‘Egoism’ for expensive hitters. Usually, 
inexpensive hitters are not fitted in flying a ball away. If they play themselves in ‘Egoism’ 
then the expected total base is even decreased. Meanwhile, expensive hitters are talented to 
make a big hit. It means that they are efficient to play themselves in ‘Egoism’ more than 
‘Altruism’ since they are paid much. For inexpensive hitters, an owner obviously chooses 
to implement ‘Altruism’ since the expected total base is larger at ‘Altruism’ than at 
‘Egoism’ and the uncertainty is smaller at ‘Altruism’ than at ‘Egoism’. Unlike inexpensive 
hitters, implementation of ‘Egoism’ for expensive hitters is a bit arguable because the 
expected total base is larger at ‘Egoism’ than ‘Altruism’, and the uncertainty is also larger 
at ‘Egoism’ than at ‘Altruism’. However, an owner accepts the increased uncertainty 
because of efficiency.  
 
To understand the concepts of expected total base and the uncertainty, a ‘sacrificing bunt’ 
can be exemplified. In the late innings, a coach usually directs a burnt to score one or to 
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break a tie because the uncertainty is reduced despite smaller expected total base. 
Occasionally, a coach technically utilizes the larger variance by allowing the larger 
expected total base for a team’s defense. In the situation that runners are on the third base 
and the second base, a pitcher intentionally walks a hitter for a double play. They focus on 
the increased uncertainty for the next hitter although his expected total base also increases. 
A ‘sacrificing bunt’ and a ‘loading bases’ start from the recognition that an increased 
expected total base does not necessarily help a team win under the larger uncertainty.  
 
Due to the larger uncertainty of total base, a team’s winning rate also faces larger 
uncertainty. High-payroll teams are constituted of many expensive hitters, and low-payroll 
teams of mainly inexpensive hitters. An owner’s different implementation provides a 
reason why high-payroll teams possibly have a low winning rate, and low-payroll teams 
have a good winning rate.  
 
1) A player’s playing spirit is observable  
 
Here, TB denotes a total base, X denotes a single, and Y denotes a big hit (including a 
homerun, a triple or a double). According to the model below, each hitter contributes to the 
team’s total revenue and he receives his salary as a reward for his contribution. An owner 
maximizes the difference between a hitter’s contribution (R(TB)) to the team’s total 
revenue and the payment to a hitter (s(TB)).  
 
( ) ( )
{ , }, ( )
( ( ) ( ))
SC SFe e e s TB
Max R TB s TB f X e f Y e dTB
∈
− +∫ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  s.t. 
( ) ( )( ( )) ( )v s TB f X e f Y e c e udTB+ − ≥∫ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  where ( ) ( ) ( )f X e f Y e f TB e+ =  
 
The constraint above represents that a salary must meet a hitter’s reservation utility to 
make him to join the ball club and to play. The maximization problem above should be 
equivalent as the minimization problem below to find the optimal salary.  
 




Min s TB f X e f Y e dTB+∫ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ s.t. ( ) ( )( ( )) ( )v s TB f X e f Y e c e udTB+ − ≥∫ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
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Min L s TB f X e f Y e u v s TB f X e f Y e c edTB dTBγ= + + − + +∫ ∫⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
The first order condition can be found for the optimum of salary.  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ( )) 0f X e f Y e v s TB f X e f Y eγ ′+ − + =⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
1





Let ˆ( )s TB denotes an optimally determined salary (the observable-effort-salary) for a hitter 
according to the optimization above. Intuitively, ˆ( )s TB can be found by the given utility 
function v. Actually, the salary will be a constant.  
 
2) A player’s playing spirit is not observable  
 
In all cases, the general manager signs the salary contract without any revealed spirits from 
a player’s side. The salary distributor would consider a player’s potential capability for the 
upcoming season, and eventually conclude that he deserves the contract. Unlike the case of 
the observable playing spirit, the optimization problem under the unobservable playing 
spirit should have two constraints, the participation constraint and the incentive constraint 
as below.  
 
 




Min s TB f X e f Y e dTB+∫ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦        (2-4) 
s.t. (1) ( ) ( )( ( )) ( )v s TB f X e f Y e c e udTB+ − ≥∫ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦     Participation constraint  (2-5) 




By the incentive contraint, a hitter would have a reason to play under one playing spirit 
rather than under the other playing spirit.  
 
3) Implementing a state Si for higher total base 
 
An owner would implement either state of ‘Egoism’ or ‘Altruism’ from hitters. 
{ },S AL EGi ∈  where AL denotes ‘Altruism’, and EG denotes ‘Egoism’. The incentive 
constraint is follows.  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )i i i i i iv s TB f X S f S c S v s TB f X S f S c SY dTB Y dTB− − −− ≥ −∫ ∫⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
The given incentive constraint, an owner finds the optimal salary for a hitter as below.  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ( )) ( ( )) ( )
( ) i i i i i
Min L s TB f X S f S u v s TB f X S f S c S
s TB
Y dTB Y dTBγ= + − +∫ ∫⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
                                                 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )i i i i i iv s TB f X S f S c S v s TB f X S f S c SY dTB Y dTBμ − − −+ − − +∫ ∫⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
(2-8) 
 
The first order condition can be found as below.    
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ( ))i i i if X S f S v s TB f X S f SY Yγ ′−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦       
                                                                     
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) 0i i i if X S f S f X S f S v s TBY Yμ − − ′+ − =⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦            (2-9) 
 
Due to the incentive constraint, the derived condition seems to be different from the 
derived condition under an observable playing spirit.  
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The simplified condition actually represents that the optimal salary under an unobservable 
playing spirit is not constant. As mentioned before, the optimal salary under an observable 
playing spirit is constant. Unlike the optimal salary under a revealed spirit, this case 
intuitively informs that the salary would depend on the probability densities of products.  
 
ˆ( )s TB  denotes an optimal salary under an observable playing spirit ( ˆ(1/ ( ( )))v s TB γ′ = ).  
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                    ⇒ ˆ( ( )) ( ( ))v s TB v s TB′ ′< ⇒ ˆ( ) ( )s TB s TB>  
 
The salary under an unobservable playing spirit is greater than the salary under an 
observable playing spirit if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i if X S f S f X S f SY Y− −>+ +                  
 
There are four cases for the inequality above. 
1) ( ) ( )i if X S f X S−> , ( ) ( )i if S f SY Y −> ⇒ ˆ( ) ( )s TB s TB> : Impossible 
2) ( ) ( )i if X S f X S−> , ( ) ( )i if S f SY Y −< ⇒Ambiguous 
3) ( ) ( )i if X S f X S−< , ( ) ( )i if S f SY Y −> ⇒Ambiguous 
4) ( ) ( )i if X S f X S−< , ( ) ( )i if S f SY Y −< ⇒ ˆ( ) ( )s TB s TB< : Impossible 
 
In fact, the first and the fourth cases are impossible. A hitter can not have larger probability 
densities for both a single and a big hit at one state than at the other state. So, we focus 
only on the second and the third cases.  
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For the second case,  
ˆ( ) ( )s TB s TB> if ( ) ( )i if X S f X S−−  is greater than ( ) ( )i if S f SY Y −− .  
This is true only when an owner implements a state of ‘Altruism’ because a probability 
density of a single at ‘Altruism’ should be larger than at ‘Egoism’, and a probability 
density of a big hit at ‘Egoism’ should be larger than at ‘Altruism’. Inexpensive players are 
not very talented to make a big hit so an owner considers them to produce more singles. A 
hitter lightly swings to make on-base by a spirit for a team’s winning more than a desire 
for his own record. So, he can make a timely single for a leadoff or a run. 
 
For the third case,  
ˆ( ) ( )s TB s TB> if ( ) ( )i if S f SY Y −−  is greater than ( ) ( )i if X S f X S−− .  
This is true only when an owner implements a state of ‘Egoism’. From an owner’s view, 
expensive players are efficient to make a big hit. In this case, they are exempted from the 
spirit of ‘Altruism’. To produce a big hit, a batter desirously swings to fly a ball away so it 
raises a probability of ‘Out’. In a state of ‘Egoism’, expensive hitters are expected to 
produce more total bases. This is the reason why an owner implements a state of ‘Egoism’ 
for expensive hitters.  
 
B. Slugger’s Choice in a ‘Component Sequential game’ 
 
Unlike other sports, baseball is a huge sequential game, which is comprised of a lot of 
small component games between a hitter and a pitcher. Total base is recorded in two ways, 
for a team and for an individual. An increase in individual’s total base implies an 
improvement in team’s total base. This is why a ‘component game’ plays an important role.  
By the incentive scheme, expensive hitters would concentrate on self-discipline to make 
more total bases. When a slugger is at bat, a ‘component game’ starts by a pitcher’s throw. 
A slugger can choose a strategy, ‘Swing Light’, ‘Swing Hard’, or ‘Don’t Swing’. For 
simplicity, a strategy of ‘Swing Light’ can produce only a single with higher probability. 
By ‘Swing Hard’, a hitter can make various outputs. He may not swing for a pitched ball. 
Then, it possibly adds a strike-ball count.  
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From a pitcher’s side, he would choose either ‘Clear-strike’ or ‘Boundary-strike’. As soon 
as a pitcher throws a ball, a component sequential game begins and a hitter would 







A clear-strike means that a pitcher throws a ball ‘clearly’ inside a strike zone. Thus, if a 
hitter does not swing then it should be definitely counted as a strike. However, this clear-
strike is riskier in the sense that the centered location is easier for batters to hit. A 
boundary-strike represents a tricky strike, which is successful by 50% chance. This ‘strike-
alike’ ball is less risky because of lower probabilities of allowing base hits. In the case that 
a batter does not swing, it can be counted as a strike by 50% or as a ball by 50%.  
 
Among ‘Swing Light’, ‘Swing Hard’, and ‘Don’t Swing’, ‘Swing Light’ enables a batter to 
precisely hit a pitched ball and have him higher probability of a base hit. That is, he could 
reduce the probability of ‘Out’ by increasing more singles. ‘Full-swing’ has diverse outputs 
such as a homerun, a triple, a double, and a single. However, the probability of ‘Out’ is 
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<Figure 2> represents a batter is situated in a subgame when a pitcher throws a ‘Boundary-
Strike’. The indicated values below the final outputs inform the probability densities. 
According to the densities, a batter has an expected base of 0.4 from ‘Swing Light’, an 
expected base of 0.53(=0.05*4+0.01*3+0.06*2+0.18*1) from ‘Swing Hard’, and an 
expected base of 0.125 (=0.5/4) from ‘Don’t swing’. Thus, a Nash Equilibrium strategy 
should be ‘Swing Hard’ for a batter in the situation that a pitcher throws a ‘Boundary-
Strike’.  
Similarly, <Figure 3> shows a batter’s subgame when a pitcher tries a ‘Clear-Strike’. By 
the given probability densities with the final outputs, an expected base from ‘Swing Light’ 
is 0.6, and an expected base from ‘Swing Hard’ is 0.78 (= 0.08*4+0.02*3+0.1*2+0.2*1). 
‘Don’t swing’ has 0. In this case, a strategy ‘Swing Hard’ is a Nash equilibrium strategy in 
the subgame. For a pitcher’s reduced game, ‘Boundary-Strike’ should be a Nash 
equilibrium strategy because he prefers less expected base. Thus, the SPNE is ((a pitcher 
throws ‘Boundary-Strike’) and (a batter chooses ‘Swing Hard’)). An expected base is 0.5.  
 
Intuitively, a pitcher already knows that a batter is going to swing hard since ‘Swing Hard’ 
should be a Nash equilibrium strategy in either subgame displayed above. All pitchers try 
to reduce allowed bases by tricky strikes as possible. Even in unfavorable situation, a 
batter swings hard because he knows that ‘Swing hard’ is still better than ‘Swing Light’ in 
any situation. Basically, the SPNE tells how uncertainty of total base is deepened and how 
baseball entertains fans. Despite a pitcher’s effort to prevent any bases, a batter is still able 
to achieve bases. In fact, most slugger’s remarkable records are achieved under 
challenging situation of many tricky balls.  
In summary, the uncertainty of total base is even more increased due to a hitter’s sequential 
game-theoretic situation.  
 
 
C. Valuation of Outputs after a Season 
 
As mentioned, each ‘component sequential game’ constitutes an entire baseball game. Due 
to a Nash equilibrium chosen for an expected base, final outputs will be still randomly 
distributed by their probability densities. Since an owner implements ‘Egoism (Self-
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discipline)’ from expensive hitters for larger expected total bases, he would assess 
sluggers’ achievements by focusing on big hits. At least, he will compare sluggers’ records 
and what they are already paid. An owner will consider those records for the next contracts. 
In this context, he has his own valuation method.  
 
First of all, one can think that an owner develops a salary function as a weighted average 
over all possible outputs, homeruns, triples, doubles, and singles. The following equation 











                      (3-1) 
 
Y denotes a batter’s salary, 1X  the number of homeruns, 2X  the number of triples, 3X  








= ∑                   (3-2) 
 
Simply, the preference of base hit can be found as 4 (homerun) > 3 (triple) > 2 (double) > 1 
(single) according to the order. First, an argument about contribution makes a homerun 
have more weight in the salary equation because the advantage of automatic runs. Unlike 
other types of base hits, a homerun automatically scores by itself. For example, a triple or a 
double requires at least another statistical event to make a run. Second, a homerun mostly 
excites fans. In most cases, people remember the homerun records and the famous 
homerun hitter such as, Babe Ruth, Hank Aaron, and Barry Bonds. Even, media 
continuously reports or forecasts who will possibly replace the on-going Homerun record 
of Bonds based on the projected results. The mentioned hitters are Alex Rodriguez (New 
York Yankees), David Ortiz (Boston Redsox), Albert Pujols (Saint Luis Cardinals), Manny 
Ramirez (L.A. Dodgers), Ryan Howard (Philadelphia Phillies), and so on. If one hitter is in 
a homerun race for a season or for his entire career, baseball fans would have more 
interests on their team and would be more tempted to join ball games. A good homerun 
hitter actually brings a positive shock on a team to raise the total revenue.  
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Furthermore, an owner would strongly prefer a homerun in the situation that a batter has a 
limited capacity to hit bigger hits. Usually, a hitter’s total number of at-bats is 
approximately restricted so the number of homeruns is supposed to decrease in the number 
of other base hits. So, the more ‘emphasis’ on homeruns is supposed to be true in salary 
equation above.  
Given capacity 100, a hitter can allocate his capacity for three types of big hits by efforts. 
For example, a good homerun hitter allocates 50% of capacity for homeruns, 10% for 
triples, and 40% for doubles. One can find that there exists proximity among big hits. In 
this case, the proximity between homeruns and triples is higher than that between 
homeruns and doubles. Intuitively, it means that the triples could have been a homerun by 
a little stronger impact. However, a double would not have been a homerun by the same 
impact. For this hitter, a double needs an additional strength to become a homerun. 
Conclusively, the athlete records fewer homeruns as he hits more triples. An opportunity 
cost would follow a triple due to a stressed weight on a homerun. In the same manner, an 
opportunity cost can be found from a double.  
 
Considering the proximities, the function (3-2) can be rewritten as (3-3). 
 
1 1 2 3 2 2 3 3 4 4ln ( , )Y X X X X X Xα α α α= + + +                    (3-3) 
 
In (3-3), 1X (Homerun) depends on both 2X (Triple) and 3X (Double). An implication is that 
the number of homerun should be affected by the number of triples and doubles under a 
limited capacity. In the same sense, the number of triples or doubles would depend on the 
number of homeruns. However, a homerun has no opportunity cost at this moment because 
of the order of preference. In fact, an owner does not concern any proximity except for the 
proximities affecting the number of homeruns.  
 











































 implies that triples have a negative effect on homeruns under a limited capacity. 
Intuitively, a negative effect informs that the proximity exists between a triple and a 
homerun. According to (3-6), an overall effect of triples on a salary is composed of two 
effects, a direct effect ( 2α ) and an indirect effect that is represented by the coefficient ( 1α ) 






). If an indirect effect dominates a direct effect, then an overall 
effect could be theoretically negative although a triple acquires three bases. An 
interpretation is that triples’ total return is not sufficient to cover its cost of losing 






























 shows that the number of homeruns are negatively related the number of doubles 
under a limited capacity. As similar as triples, an actual effect of doubles on salaries is 










implication is the same as the case of triples. However, it is presumed that the proximity 
between doubles and homeruns is smaller than the proximity between triples and 
homeruns. Accordingly, a direct effect is supposed to outweigh an indirect effect so a 
 50
positive effect of doubles on a salary would be expected. An implication is that a double 
contributes the same as a triple with less opportunity cost so an owner is ready to 









                                             (3-8) 
 
The inequality (3-8) shows that the proximity between triples and homeruns is greater than 
the proximity between doubles and homeruns. More details will be discussed by empirical 
findings in the next chapter. 
 
Empirically, 1X  must be an endogenous variable since it depends on both 2X  and 3X  
in (3-3). Thus, the variable of homerun should be treated as an endogenous variable in a 
regression analysis. Without considering an endogenous property, a simple regression must 





A. American League  
 
Data description 28 hitters and 289 observations  
Each player has the same number of observations as his career years.  
Gary Shaffield has the longest career by 17 years (1989-2006), and Justin Morneau has the shortest 
career by 3 years (2004-2006). 
 
To investigate determining factors of salaries, the variable of Salary could be regressed 
onto all types of base hits including the variable of Homerun. 
 
Salary X uβ= +  where [ ] 5NX Con Single Double Triple Homerun ×=    (4-1) 
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According to the theory explained in the last section, Homerun should be an endogenous 
variable since an owner considers opportunity costs behind triples and doubles. 
Instrumental variables are available for homeruns. Walk and Strikeout seem to have a high 
correlation with homeruns. Thus, Homerun should be regressed onto all base hits and the 
suggested instrumental variables, Walk and Strikeout, for the second stage least square 
estimation.  
 
The following table actually shows the proximities and the correlations between homeruns 




Homerun Coefficient S.E. t-Value P-Value 
Single .2139245 .0152737 14.01 0.000 
Double -.4841474 .0621964 -7.78 0.000 
Triple -.7394117 .1957041 -3.78 0.000 
Walk    .113987 .016615 6.86 0.000 
Strikeout .0898962 .0143799 6.25 0.000 
Homerun seems to be correlated with various outputs. The obtained estimated coefficients 
provide some implications. Double has a negative estimate (-0.484), and Triple also has a 
negative estimate (-0.739) that is greater in an absolute term than -0.484. These two 
different estimates represent different levels of proximities. The estimates strongly support 











The next step is to test if Homerun is indeed endogenous or not. Here, two instrumental 
variables, Walk and Strikeout, can be implemented by the fact that a good homerun hitter 
records a lot of walks and strike-outs as well. For example, David Ortiz hit 54 homeruns in 
2006. He recorded 119 walks and 117 strikeouts at the same year. As discussed, a pitcher 
would avoid a slugger’s powering batting by an intentional walk, or by throwing a ‘strike-
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alike’ ball, which is actually fishing a batter.  
 
A pitcher implements the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy by pitching a ‘strike-alike’ 
ball according to the theory in the previous section. The derived SPNE supports that 
expensive hitters prefer ‘Swing Hard’ to ‘Swing Light’, and batters actually have strike-
outs more times because of their attempts to put an exceedingly strong impact on a pitched 
ball. This physically overwhelming effort raises a possibility of a strike-out. Thus, walks 
and strike-outs can be good instrumental variables for homeruns. For implementing these 
instrumental variables, the residual should be obtained through the regression (4-2) as 
below.  
 
Homerun Zα ε= +                       (4-2) 
where [ ] 5NZ Single Double Triple Walk Strikeout ×=   
 
Eventually, the variable ‘Salary’ will be regressed onto all the explanatory variables 
including the residuals obtained from the regression (4-2) as above. 
 
ˆSalary X uβ γε= + +                   (4-3) 
 
The null hypothesis 0 : 0H γ =  is tested. By rejecting the null hypothesis, it can be 




Ln_Salaries1 Coefficient S.E t-Value P-Value 
Single .0016813 .0047315 0.36 0.723 
Double .0115548 .013084 0.88 0.378 
Triple -.093309 .037516 -2.49 0.013 
Homerun .0297622 .0105339 2.83 0.005 
Residual .0379959 .0167703 2.27 0.024 
Constant 12.87462 .2012876 63.96 0.000 
 
 53
Apparently, the null hypothesis of 0 : 0H γ =  should be rejected by the obtained results. 
Homerun is concluded as an endogenous variable. Furthermore, the test results inform that 
a simple OLS would result in some errors. Therefore, the second stage estimation is 
recommended to avoid any errors. However, both test results will be provided cohesively 
for a comparison and a contrast in this research.  
 
 
1) With a simple OLS 
 




Ln_Salaries1 Coefficient S.E t-Value P-Value 
Single .0086116 .0036362 2.37 0.019 
Double .0004604 .012222 0.04 0.970 
Triple -.1145622 .0365905 -3.13 0.002 
Homerun .0447534 .0082566 5.42 0.000 
Constant 12.86299 .2026966 63.46 0.000 
 
The relatively smaller hits such as singles and doubles lead to very small estimates 0.009 
and 0.0005 for Single and Double, respectively. However, the relatively bigger bits, triples 
and homeruns have bigger estimates. Remarkably, there is a huge difference between an 
estimate for Double and that for Triple in an absolute value.  The question is if the 
abnormally big difference between two estimates rises from the errors, and the difference 
would be reduced by 2SLS.  
 
 
2) With a 2SLS 
 
The second stage estimation shows the results in the following table. Comparing to the 
OLS, the estimated coefficients seem to be aligned by 2SLS estimation. That is, the 
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estimates for Double and Homerun are actually increased, but the estimate for Triple is 




Ln_Salaries1 Coefficient S.E t-Value P-Value 
Single .0016813 .0048315 0.35 0.728 
Double .0115548 .0133607 0.86 0.388 
Triple -.093309 .0383094 -2.44 0.015 
Homerun .0677582 .013325 5.09 0.000 
Constant 12.87462 .2055443 62.64 0.000 
 
Different from the OLS, the p-value of Single substantially rises from 0.019 to 0.728 by 
2SLS. The p-value of Double falls to 0.388, and the p-value of Triple rises to 0.015. 
However, the estimate of Triple is still significant. By either estimation, Homerun is most 
significant.   
 
Table 1-4 exhibits an interesting result that the p-values are actually arranged in an order 
by Single, Double, Triple and Homerun. That is, Homerun is most significant in 
determining the salary with the estimated coefficient, 0.068. The second is Triple with the 
estimated coefficient, -.093. The third is Double with the estimate, 0.012, and the fourth is 
Single with 0.002.  
Notably, the most significant variable, Homerun, has the largest positive estimated 
coefficient, and Double has the second. Single has the third. Triple has the negative 
estimate.  
 
All of these estimates indicate that an owner concentrates on homeruns rather than any 
other types of hits at his decision for a hitter’s salary. According to the test result, Double 
has a positive effect on a salary however it is insignificant. Triple has a negative impact on 
a salary with sufficient significance even though a triple acquires more bases than a double 
or a single. It seems that a double is strictly preferred to a triple. An insignificant positive 
estimate of Double implies that doubles do not play any negative roles in salary. Moreover, 
its insignificance might imply zero effect on a salary. In another word, doubles would 
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bring some effects at least as much as 0 despite its unclearness. Meanwhile, triples 
significantly have a negative effect on a salary. The implications support a double’s 
priority to a triple in an owner’s mind.  
 
More intuitively, the obtained estimates tell that a boss actually puts the top priority on the 
number of homerun, and the second priority on a slugger’s contribution to win. That is, he 
concerns about the number of homeruns mainly because a homerun acquires four bases, 
which actually scores one without any runners on bases and entertains fans most excitedly. 
As explained before, a double has less opportunity cost than a triple and contributes the 
same as a triple. With considering both the number of homeruns and contribution from a 
base hit, an owner has in his mind that a double might be better than a triple. Empirically, 
the negative estimate of Triple actually shows that an owner finds less efficiency from a 
triple due to its greater opportunity cost and its same level of contribution as a double. 
 
B. National League 
 
Data description 39 hitters and 369 observations  
Each player has the same number of observations as his career years.  
Bary Bonds has the longest career by 20 years (1987-2006), and Ryan Howard has the shortest 
career by 2 years (2005-2006). 
 
 
Here, National League is discussed. Homerun is regressed onto fewer hits, and Walk and 
Strikeout as similar as before. As the result, the estimates are shown in Table 2-1. 
Comparing Table 2-1 to Table 1-1, Triple is observed to have a bigger proximity (-1.03) in 
National League than in American League (-0.74). Double has a smaller proximity (-0.27) 
than in (-0.48) American League. The some differences in proximities may arise from 
batting-pitchers in National League. In fact, the proximities play a crucial role in 






Homerun Coefficient S.E. t-Value P-Value 
Single .1910018 .0178108 10.72 0.000 
Double -.2701738 .0640572 -4.22 0.000 
Triple -1.031126 .1553716 -6.64 0.000 
Walk   .1381923 .012932 10.69 0.000 
Strikeout .057763 .0109794 5.26 0.000 
 
Also, the bigger estimated coefficient (0.14) for Walk and the smaller estimated coefficient 
(0.06) for Strikeout are found in Table 2-1, compared to Table 2-1(0.11 and 0.09, 
respectively for Walk and Strikeout). Baseball fans acknowledge a reason. Traditionally, 
both leagues are mainly different by the designated hitting system, which allows one hitter 
not to join in fielding. American League accepts the designated hitting rule but National 
League does not. Thus, all fielders including a pitcher have to join a batting line-up in 
National League. In this case, there exits the weakest spot in the line-up because of a 
pitching-hitter so an opponent team’s pitcher can intentionally walk power hitters more 
times to face a pitching-hitter in National League. Sluggers tend to have more walks and 
fewer strike-outs in National League than in American League.  
 
Under the presumption that Homerun is an endogenous variable, Salary is regressed onto 
all other explanatory variables including the residuals obtained from the simple OLS above. 




Ln_Salaries1 Coefficient S.E t-Value P-Value 
Single -.0050084    .0051403    -0.97    0.331     
Double .027438     .012578     2.18    0.030     
Triple -.0413302    .0348975 -1.18    0.237     
Homerun .0231364     .009739     2.38    0.018     
Residual .0418539    .0177585     2.36    0.019     
Constant 13.23069    .1802799    73.39    12.87617    
 
 57
There is no big difference for the estimated coefficient for Residual between Table 1-2 
(0.038) and Table 2-2 (0.042). It is largely because the effect from the bigger estimate of 
Walk has been offset by the effect from the smaller estimate of Strikeout in National 
League. Accordingly, Residual has the low P-value (0.019), which sufficiently supports the 
significance of the estimate (0.042). Thus, Homerun is concluded as an endogenous 
variable.     
 
1) With a simple OLS 
 
By the endogenous variable of Homerun, 2SLS method is recommended to prevent any 
errors from occurring in estimation. However, a simple OLS estimation results are 




Ln_Salaries1 Coefficient S.E t-Value P-Value 
Single .0032037 .0038026     0.84    0.400     
Double .0193204 .0121727     1.59    0.113     
Triple -.0814523 .0306536    -2.66    0.008     
Homerun .0357242 .0081946     4.36    0.000     
Constant 13.19992 .1809281    72.96    0.000     
 
By a simple OLS, Triple seems to have the biggest effect on a salary by the negative 
estimate (-0.081) with the P-value of 0.008. Homerun has the second biggest effect by the 
positive estimate (0.036) with P-value of 0.000. Double has the third biggest effect 
however the estimate is not significant (p-value of 0.113). Interestingly, the estimated 
coefficient of Homerun is much smaller than the estimate of Triple in an absolute term. 
The problem may rise from the endogenous Homerun.   
2) With a 2SLS 
 
The estimators should be biased and inconsistent by a simple OLS largely because of one 





Ln_Salaries1 Coefficient S.E t-Value P-Value 
Single -.0050084 .0052622  -0.95 0.342     
Double .027438 .0128763 2.13 0.034     
Triple -.0413302 .0357251 -1.16    0.248     
Homerun .0649903 .015202 4.28    0.000     
Constant 13.23069 .1845552 71.69    0.000     
 
The 2SLS estimation produces some pattern of estimates as similar as the observed in 
American League. That is, Homerun has the largest positive estimate (0.065), and Double 
has the second largest (0.027438). Triple has the negative estimate (-0.0413). The 
important point is that Double becomes significant in National League while it is 
insignificant in American League. On the contrary, Triple is significant in American 
League however it turns to be insignificant in National League.  
 
 Some inferences are possibly found from the estimate of Triple. Theoretically, an overall 
effect of triples on a salary is comprised of two parts, which are a direct effect ( 2α ) and an 







). Intuitively, a direct effect can be represented by the estimated 
coefficient of Triple from a simple OLS. An indirect effect can be actually calculated by 
the OLS estimate of Homerun times the proximity between homeruns and doubles in the 
league. National League has bigger estimate (-0.041) with bigger P-value than American 
League (-0.093 with P-value, 0.015). In absolute terms, triples have a bigger effect on a 
salary in American League.  
 
There are two reasons. First, American League has much more emphasis on homeruns 
since its designated hitting rule can support more professionalism in the league. In fact, 
one expensive slugger entirely specializes in batting without any fielding. By the allowed 
specialty, an owner would anticipate more homeruns from a designated hitter. Thus, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the coefficient 1α  is greater in American League than in 
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National League. Actually, 1α is known as 0.045 in American League, and it is 0.036 in 
National League. With the given proximity, the bigger 1α  implies the bigger estimate of 
Triple. Second, the two different proximities between a homerun and a triple are found in 
both American League and National League. The proximities are -0.739 and -1.031 for 
American League and National League, respectively.  
 
 
C. Two Digit Triples 
 
A triple rarely happens in a ball game. Since it seems hard to obtain three bases by one 
base hit, most players normally record less than ten triples per season. However, some 
players can advance to the third base by a double with their good base-running. These 
talented runners tend to produce abnormally many triples by their inborn skillfulness. In 
fact, these players have the history of recording two digit triples for many years. Two digit 
triples are unusual for other sluggers. 
 
In some senses, those triples of talented runners are not appropriate to measure the 
proximity. Some level of attention should be paid on these abnormal observations to see if 
they might have affected the entire regression results. Unlike hitters in American League, 
many hitters are found to have recorded two digit triples in National League. Players’ 
outstanding-base running might exogenously influence the proximity between homeruns 
and triples. This could be a good reason why a big difference exists between two 
proximities in both leagues. So, new estimation is suggested after eliminating all the two 
digit triples from National League. The test results are as follows.  
   
National League (Without two digit triples) 
 





Homerun Coefficient S.E. t-Value P-Value 
Single .1970244 .0178051 11.07 0.000 
Double -.299278 .0643885 -4.65 0.000 
Triple -.9059067 .1781947 -5.08 0.000 
Walk .136978 .0128841 10.63 0.000 
Strikeout .0556785 .010892 5.11 0.000 
 
From Table 3-1, Triple turns out to have the larger estimated coefficient (-0.906) than the 
estimate (-1.031) in Table 2-1 after eliminating the two digit triples. The proximity 
between homeruns and triples is reduced. It means that a marginal effect of a triple on the 
number of homeruns has been weakened. On the other hand, the proximity between 
homeruns and doubles is strengthened. Two different proximities seem more balanced by 





Ln_Salaries1 Coefficient S.E t-Value P-Value 
Single -.0063998 .005304 -1.21 0.228 
Double .0345286 .0129834 2.66 0.008 
Triple -.0839387 .0375094 -2.24 0.026 
Homerun .0252853 .0099478 2.54 0.011 
Residual .0421195 .018147 2.32 0.021 
Constant 13.24066 .1811125 73.11 0.000 
 
The endogeneity of Homerun should be tested. By the result shown in Table 3-2, Homerun 
is concluded as endogenous. Since Homerun is an endogenous variable, a simple OLS 
would produce a biased and an inconsistent estimator. As similar as previous studies, the 
OLS estimates are still provided for a comparison with the 2SLS estimates.  
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Ln_Salaries1 Coefficient S.E t-Value P-Value 
Single .0020497 .0038811 0.53 0.958 
Double .0252138 .0124235 2.03 0.043 
Triple -.1181063 .0347119 -3.40 0.001 
Homerun .0379424 .0083711 4.53 0.000 
Constant 13.20513 .1815728 72.73 0.000 
 
As seen in Table 3-3 above, the estimates of all the base hits are found to diminish after 
eliminating two digit triples. The estimate of Triple is actually decreased (increased in an 
absolute term). Here, the argument is focused more on a marginal effect of a base hit on a 
salary so the changes in estimates have interpretations that marginal effects of base hits 
have been affected by removing two digit triples. In fact, it indicates that two digit triples 
have played some roles in the regression results. Homerun has quite a small estimated 
coefficient 0.038. The marginal effect of homeruns on a salary seems weak. The relatively 
small effect strongly supports that the estimates are actually biased and inconsistent.  
 




Ln_Salaries1 Coefficient S.E t-Value P-Value 
Single -.0063998 .0054286 -1.18 0.239 
Double .0345286 .0132885 2.60 0.010 
Triple -.0839387 .0383908 -2.19 0.029 
Homerun .0674049 .015534 4.34 0.000 
Constant 13.24066 .1853682 71.43 0.000 
 
Usually, good base-runners show relatively many triples largely due to their techniques but 
fewer homeruns, compared to other sluggers. It means that most of their triples would have 
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been a double to a normal-base-runner. However, the skillful hitters can obtain one more 
base by their tactics and their timely run. This point was not taken into account in the 
previous regressions. As a result, a triple seems to have less opportunity cost for a homerun. 
In American League, the estimated coefficient of Triple is -0.093, and the estimate 
substantially rises up to -0.041 in National League. Without two digit triples, the estimate 
restore the lower level -0.084 in National League. As discussed, the changed estimates 




‘Over-emphasis’ of homerun was the arguing point in the beginning of this research. 
Different from other sports, higher payroll does not necessarily improve team 
performances. Theoretically, owners hire expensive hitters and implement ‘Egoism (Self-
discipline)’ from those hitters to have larger expected total bases by increasing the number 
of ‘big hits’ and by decreasing the number of singles. Thus, the uncertainty of total base 
increases. At bats, the expensive hitters choose ‘Swing Hard’ in either case that a pitcher 
throws a ‘Clear-strike’ or a ‘Boundary-strike’. In a sequential game, a pitcher throws a 
‘Boundary-strike’ as the first mover. So, the uncertainty of total bases increases even more 
by these strike-alike balls. When a season ends, an owner collects all hitter’s records, 
reviews them, and compares them to his payments before he makes new contracts for the 
next year. He must have his own salary function.  
 
Empirically, an owner’s salary function is estimated by the second stage least square. As 
the theory points out in section 2, owners totally disregard the number of singles to 
determine expensive hitters in both American League and National League. The P-values 
of Single are very high in both leagues. Meanwhile, bigger hits such as Homerun, Triple, 
and Double have significant estimates. Specially, Homerun always has the largest positive 
estimate in every case with 0 P-value. An implication is that the number of homeruns 
makes a big impact on an owner’s decision for a salary. Double also has positive estimates 
in all cases. The positive estimates of Homerun and Double support that owners actually 
emphasize big hits and implement ‘Egoism (Self-discipline)’. Interestingly, Triple has 
negative estimates in all cases. The negative estimate of Triple strongly supports that an 
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owner ‘over-emphasizes’ a homerun. As explained in section 2, the negative estimate could 
happen because of the opportunity cost for a homerun. The opportunity costs from a triple 
and a double actually change an owner’s preference toward both types of hits. A double is 
preferred to a triple with less opportunity cost. In fact, the negative estimates of Triple 
show that owners put ‘over-emphasis’ on the number of homeruns.  
 
Due to overall strength on big hits and over-emphasis on homeruns, the expected total 
bases increase and the uncertainty of total bases also increases. By ‘over-emphasis’ on a 
homerun, an owner does not successfully reduce the uncertainty of total bases but actually 
increase the uncertainty even more despite a lot of payments for expensive hitters. Under 
the larger uncertainty, the results of ball games seem more random. 
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Chapter 3. Any Subsidy Converges to a Direct Quantity Control 




A subsidy and a direct quantity control are leading trade policies over many countries. 
Many researchers have tried to figure out how these two main policies would support the 
domestic exporters and, furthermore, develop national welfare since these policies are 
mostly useful for helping domestic firms improve their profits. Interestingly, Cooper and 
Riezman (1989) found a general conclusion under what condition one policy is more 
useful than the other based on a game-theoretic approach. According to them, a subsidy is 
a dominant policy when a foreign market is placed under a sufficiently large uncertainty. 
The paper also shows that a dominant policy becomes a direct quantity control if 
uncertainty reduces to a sufficiently lower level in a foreign market. The result intuitively 
makes sense. Under no market uncertainty, an oligopolist reasonably would earn more 
profit by a constrained quantity. However, it is unsure if a constrained quantity still helps 
earn more profit under large demand variability. This is what Cooper and Riezman have 
mainly found through their four-stage long sequential game frame.  
 
An important question can be raised when we extent their results to an infinite horizon 
model. That is, if we let the governments choose their policies through an infinite horizon 
then the subsidy policy is not so efficient. For example, if a government individually 
subsidizes exporters for every period infinite times then a social cost would be 
substantially big although a future subsidy should be discounted. Instead, if the policy 
makers reallocate a part of subsidy for infrastructure, in purpose, to stabilize demand 
variability for their own exporters and successfully induce a direct quantity control then 
the overall social cost could be saved.  
 
This paper shows how a government improves total discounted social benefit by 
reallocating a subsidy through an infinite horizon and any dominant subsidy policy is 
changed to a direct quantity control over time. This paper eventually shows how the C-R 
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(referring Cooper and Riezman)’s SPNE, under the sufficiently large demand variability, 
changes over time for two different cases, one-sided intervention and both-sided 
intervention. In section 4, one-sided intervention represents that only one government 
involves in the project of stabilizing demand. In this case, the SPNE changes only once 
because one government actually changes its dominant policy to a quantity control by the 
time that the demand variability is stabilized. The SPNE might change more than once if 
both governments join the project of stabilizing demand.  
 
In section 5, we discuss the both-sided intervention case. Depending on the number of 
exporting firms, the SPNE would change only once or more than once. That is, if both 
countries have the same number of exporting firms then the demand stability is realized at 
the same time for both countries. Under this symmetric case, the SPNE would change only 
once over time because both governments coincidentally choose a quantity control as a 
dominant policy. Instead, if both countries have different number of exporting firms then 
their demand stabilities are realized by the different timings because of asymmetric 
condition. Under this asymmetric condition, the SPNE would change twice over time 





According to Cooper and Riezman (1989), both governments involving trade policy game 
face four stages to reach a final output. At the first stage, the two public authorities 
determine an intervention mode. Secondly, the rivals decide intervention levels. At the 
third, market uncertainty is revealed to the firms. Finally, the firms maximize their profits 
with the given government’s intervention at the fourth stage. Most of all, the firms’ optimal 
quantities under the given trade policies must be found in the fourth stage.  
 
Cooper and Riezman introduced the concept of social benefit, the sum of all domestic 
firms’ profits. By using the derived the optimal quantities in the fourth stage, an expected 
social benefit function or formula can be investigated from a domestic government’s view. 
The problem is to find the ex post subsidy that maximizes this expected social benefit. 
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Simply speaking, the policy makers need to find a Nash equilibrium of the reduced game 
as an optimal subsidy. This Nash equilibrium actually represents the SPNE. The authors 
have different SPNE according to the size of variance, which is denoted byθ . In fact, 
when the variance of θ  is sufficiently large, the government’s policy mode must be 
chosen as a subsidy. When the variance of θ  becomes sufficiently small, the 
government’s policy mode should be chosen as a direct quantity control. 
Intuitively, a government anticipates how domestic firms would obtain their profits from 
the trade policy or it can be foreseen how the firms will be benefited by the selected 
governmental service. To choose any policy, a government considers an expected social 
benefit, the sum of all domestic firms’ expected profits.  
 
The values below show the obtained expected social benefits in an oligopolistic situation 
from both governments’ perspectives by Cooper and Riezman. According to the tables, 
each government would reach an expected social benefit by choosing a trade police such 
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Both governments simultaneously select either subsidy or direct quantity control as a 
policy mode, and four different sequential game starts with four nodes if the entire police 
game is depicted. So, there are supposed to be four different expected social benefits in a 
reduced form at which both governments choose their police modes. In a game theoretic 
sense, the four-stage long extensive game has been reduced to a one-shot simultaneous 
game by backward induction.  
 
According to the expected social benefits matrix above, the SPNE is ((Policy mode is 
Subsidy, Policy mode is Subsidy), ( *1s ,
*




2q )) when ( )Var θ is 
sufficiently large. This SPNE changes to ((Policy mode is Direct Quantity Control, Policy 
mode is Direct Quantity Control), ( **1q ,
**




2q )) when ( )Var θ is 




Any exporting firms are supposed to encounter a substantial level of demand variability in 
a newly developed foreign market. Sometimes, foreign customers have biased preferences 
toward the origins of products or the nationalities. If they originate from the same country 
then they are assumed to meet the same demand variability. Under a volatile demand, a 
subsidy should be a dominant policy for both governments according to Cooper and 
Riezman because a policy helps firms individually adjust to unstable circumstances. 
However, if policy makers think over their choices under an infinite horizon, they would 
realize that stabilizing market demand eventually helps improve their social benefit more 
than subsidizing firms for every period. First, they assess demand variability and search for 
any possibility to lower the variability for domestic firms. Accordingly, a government 
spends some expenditure for infrastructure to stabilize demand.  
 
For example, Korean government has a special institution such as KOTRA to bolster 
domestic exporters, and the public institution has local agencies over many countries. Its 
main objective is to help Korean firms have more information about a market or a local 
area. In fact, highly skilled manpower performs a high quality of research about a market 
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and regularly has an open seminar in which consumer reports and market details are 
covered. In some cases, they are requested a market survey or forecasting. Since KOTRA 
successfully achieved its goal of supporting Korean exporters over all countries, some 
local governments of Korea have their own institutions or facilities to benefit mid-sized 
firms originating from their local provinces these days.  
 
Korean exporting firms used to be provided a financial support (a subsidy) for their 
exported products. However, they are more benefited from well-founded governmental 
agencies over the world. Intuitively, Korean firms would become oligopolists when they 
eventually have stable demand, and they are suggested to constrain the exported quantity 
for raising their profitability.  
 
 
1) Variance Assessment 
 
A government collects all information about a market and concludes that the demand 
variability could be overcome by a public-led effort. The variance of iθ  is a decreasing 
function of expenditure for infrastructure ( 1g ) such as
2( )i i iVar kgθ σ= − . As mentioned, 
the market level of variance is a sum of all individual levels of variances such 
as
1













= ∑ . The variance of total 
demand is constituted of the variances of individual demands such as 
1




Var Q Var q
=
= ∑ . 
Products are originated from different countries so the differently-originated products 
would face different demand variabilities due to prejudices for their origins. For example, 
Japanese cars, Korean mobile phones. Customers usually generalize a product’s quality by 
its origin.  
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2) Expenditure for infrastructure  
 
A government actually spends some expenditure ( 1g ) on establishing public infrastructure 




Here, only one government has a motivation to lower demand variability for helping its 
domestic firms by a public infrastructure. In the following section, two different 
governments simultaneously establish a public infrastructure for their own domestic firms.   
 
Formally, government 1 reallocates the pre-determined budget *1s  for subsidy into 1s (a 
subsidy for exported good) and 1g (expenditure for infrastructure). That is, 
*
1 1 1s s g= + . 
Simply speaking, government 1 finds the optimal value, *1g , maximizing the total 
expected discounted social benefit by reducing the demand variability to the efficient level 
under the constraint, *1 1 1s s g= + .   
However, government 2 spends no expenditure for infrastructure ( 2 0g = ) because of no 
reallocated subsidy. Thus, *2 2s s= .  
As government 1 spends some money for infrastructure over time to bring demand stability, 
a stable demand becomes present earlier. Importantly, Cooper and Riezman have not 
provided the information about the value of variance by which an unstable demand could 
be turned into a stable demand. A government would recognize ‘by chance’ that the 
individual variability for its domestic firms has been sufficiently reduced. A stable demand 
is assumed to arrive by exponential probability density.  
 
A government’s expenditure for infrastructure affects the timing of a stable demand. If 1g  
denotes an instantaneous spending for infrastructure by government 1 then the instant 
success rate for realization of a stable demand, u  is 1( )gα . The time of occurrence of 
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1( ) ( ) u
g
u u g e
α τψ τ α −= ,  0 uτ< < ∞  
 
 
The dominance of a subsidy policy still remains until 1θ ’s variance diminishes to the 
sufficiently small level. As mentioned, the value of the sufficiently small variance is still 
unknown. Implicatively, a public-led effort can not stop due to unawareness of the 
boundary of variance although the variance continuously diminishes. Rather, a government 
would recognize an arrival of a stable demand for its domestic firms by chance.  
 
Once individual demand variability is sufficiently reduced, a direct quantity control 
becomes a dominant policy for a government while the rival still chooses a subsidy policy. 
The SPNE changes by the timing of a stable demand for country 1. 
 
As mentioned before, government 1 takes a part ( 1g ) from the pre-determined level (
*
1s ) 
and reallocates for each period. With expenditure for infrastructure ( 01g > ), the new 
expected social benefit can be found as follows. 
 
2
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where 1 1s s′ <  and 
2
1 1( )Var kgθ σ′ = −  
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With an increased expenditure ( 1g ) for infrastructure, an individual-financial support 
(subsidy) level for an exported product should be reduced, and ( )Var θ continuously 
diminishes for every time period while the government’s overall expenditure ( *1 1s s g= + ) 
for domestic firms should remain the same.  
 
* * * * 1
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As a subsidy is reduced, total social benefit decreases. Interestingly, the marginal change 
of total social benefit from reducing a subsidy and establishing infrastructure can be 
minimized for each period. With continuous spending for demand stability, a stable 
demand will be realized. However, the timing of a stable demand is randomly distributed 
as mentioned. By an arrival of a stable demand, two separate stages (the Initial Stage and 
Stage One) can be defined. In the Initial Stage, a government still spends some money for 
infrastructure to bring a stable demand and no firms have a stable demand. The Initial 
Stage continues until demand stability is achieved by government 1’s support. By an 
occurrence of demand stability, the Initial Stage changes to Stage One. Both governments 
have different total expected social welfares in each stage. At first, the total expected 
discounted social benefits in Stage One for both governments can be found. 
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1) In Stage One 
 
In Stage One, the demand variability remains sufficiently small for the firms originating 
from country 1. A stable demand is assumed to take place at t N= . However, the firms 
originating from the other country still face larger demand variability. 
 
By the timing of a stable demand, government 1 would deviate from a subsidy to a direct 
quantity control. By government 1’s deviation, both governments face the new expected 
social benefits as below. By referring to the expected social benefit matrix (Table 1) and 
(Table 2),  
 
** *



















( 3) ( 1)
Vara c






Government 2 still has a dominant policy of a subsidy because
2
( )Var θ has never changed. 
Actually, the new bilateral game starts at t N=  and new social benefits are ** *1 1 2( , )E q sπ  
and ** *2 1 2( , )E q sπ  for country 1 and country 2, respectively, in every time period. By 
comparing ** *1 1 2( , )E q sπ  and
** *
2 1 2( , )E q sπ , an interesting point can be found. Unlike 
country 1, the variance plays a major role in the new social benefit for country 2. It 
ironically supports that a subsidy policy is proper under larger uncertainty and the firms 
from country 2 still has larger demand variability. An intuition is that total social welfare 
for country 2 has larger uncertainty while total social welfare for country 1 has less 
uncertainty.  
 
With a government-supported infrastructure, a trade policy converges to a direct quantity 
control. A government always considers the best policy for its own domestic exporters. 
Under an unstable demand, a subsidy helps domestic firms most efficiently because funded 
firms can individually adjust to dynamic market circumstances. Meanwhile, a direct 
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quantity control policy must be more efficient under a stable demand. In fact, oligopoly 
firms tend to sell smaller amount at a higher price for larger total revenue in a market. This 
is the main reason why a government chooses a direct quantity control as a dominant 
policy under demand stability.   
Let * ,1H N  denote the government 1’s total expected discounted social welfare at t N= . 
 
** *
* ** * 1 1 2








∞ −= =∫  
          
Let * ,2H N  denote the government 2’s expected discounted total social welfare at t N= . 
** *
* ** * 2 1 2








∞ −= =∫  
 
 
2) In the Initial Stage 
 
As remarked earlier, the Initial Stage lasts unless market uncertainty is removed, and 
government 1 still spends expenditure for infrastructure to support domestic exporters. To 
avoid any confusion, the Initial Stage is assumed to start at 0t = .  
 
Let *0,1H  denote government 1’s total expected discounted social benefit at 0t = . No 
one knows when a stable demand is realized for the firms from country 1. A stable demand 
causes a substantial change on an exporter’s profit and eventually on a government’s 
expected discounted total social benefit. Government 1 is able to derive *0,1H  by the 
randomly distributed timing of a stable demand and its probability density function, 
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Interestingly, government 1 can determine the optimal level of 1g  in each period. The 
intuition is that when the government reduces an individual financial support (a subsidy) 
and allocates the reduction for a public infrastructure the expected social welfare is not 
linearly decreased. As mentioned before, a marginal decrease of the expected social benefit 
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With government 1’ optimal expenditure ( *1g ) for infrastructure, the instant success rate is 
determined. As government 1 spends a determined expenditure to reduce 1( )Var θ for 
more time periods, the probability of reaching a stable demand rises.  
 
Country 1’s total expected social welfare can be calculated as follows.  
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Let *0,2H  denote government 2’s total expected discounted social benefit at 0t = . 
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Since the optimal choice of expenditure for infrastructure is made by government 1, SPNE 
should be revised for each period.  
 
The SPNE, ((Policy mode is Subsidy, Policy mode is Subsidy), ( *1s ,
*
2s ), ( 1θ  and 2θ  are 
revealed), ( *1q ,
*
2q )), lasts until a stable demand is realized for the firms from country 1.  
Then it turns to New SPNE, ((Policy mode is Direct quantity control, Policy mode is 
Subsidy), ( **1q ,
*
2s ), ( 1θ  and 2θ  are revealed and 1( )Var θ turns out to be sufficiently 
small), ( **1q ,
*
2q )). 





Only one government has been discussed so far. Here, both governments simultaneously 
reduce their levels of subsidies for increasing total social benefits under infinite horizon. 
They do prefer less uncertainty of total social welfare so stabilizing demand for their 
domestic firms would help. There are two different cases, symmetry and asymmetry. The 
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symmetry supports that both countries have equal number of firms in a foreign market. 
The asymmetry represents the case that one country has larger number of firms than the 
other country in a foreign market. Thus, demand variability for the firms from the country 
should be larger than demand variability for the firms from the other country. A stable 
demand takes more time in this case.  
 
 
1. Symmetric case ( 1 2N N N= = ) 
 
This case represents that both countries would have equal number of firms in a foreign 
market. Unlike the asymmetric case, Nash equilibrium expenditure for infrastructure is 
identical for both governments. An intuition is that both governments’ choices would be 
the same under the same circumstances. The identical choices lead all the firms to have a 
stable demand at the same time regardless their origins since the instant success rates 
become the same in this case.  
 
As similar as the asymmetric case, there are two different stages, Initial Stage and Stage 
One. In the Initial Stage, both governments spend money for infrastructure and a stable 
demand is not realized in this stage. This stage maintains until both governments 
successively stabilize the demands for their own domestic firms. By the timing of 
stabilizing demands, the Initial Stage changes into Stage One. No governments spend 
money for infrastructure in Stage one since a stable demand coincidentally happens for all 
the firms regardless the origins.  
 
1) Stage One 
 
Both governments stop spending for infrastructure. By stable demands for all the firms 
from both origins, both governments would change a trade policy from a subsidy to a 
direct quantity control. In this stage, the total expected discounted social benefits for both 
governments are as follows. It is assumed that stable demands happen for the firms from 
both countries at t N= .  
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Let * ,1H N  denote the government 1’s total expected discounted social welfare at t N= . 
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Let * ,2H N  denote the government 2’s total expected discounted social welfare at t N= . 
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2) The Initial Stage 
 
In this stage, no stable demand has been realized for the firms from either country. Both 
governments continuously spend money for infrastructure to reduce the market variances 
for their own domestic firms. By backward induction, the entire sequential game can be 
reduced to the Initial Stage. Both governments’ total expected discounted social benefits 
are found as below.  
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Let *0,2H  denote the government 2’s total expected discounted social welfare at 0t = . 
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In determining the optimal expenditure for infrastructure, both governments would face 
the simultaneous game situation. As reviewed in one-sided intervention case, when a 
government cuts a subsidy to support infrastructure then a marginal decrease of the 
expected social welfare can be minimized. In this context, Nash Equilibrium ( )* *1 2,g g  
can be found.  
 
Due to the expenditures for infrastructure, both governments reduce subsidies as below.   
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The corresponding quantities are found as follows. 
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Both firms’ new social welfare functions are derived as below.  
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By minimizing the marginal decrease of total social benefits from the reduced subsidy, 
Nash Equilibrium ( )* *1 2,g g can be found.  
 
From the first order condition, 
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Under the symmetric condition 1 2N N= , each government considers that its rival would 
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The equilibrium total expected discounted social benefits for both governments are found 
as below, and they are actually equal.  
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Thus, ** **0,1 0,2H H=  
 
The SPNE, ((Policy mode is Subsidy, Policy mode is Subsidy), ( *1s ,
*
2s ), ( 1θ  and 2θ  are 
revealed), ( *1q ,
*
2q )), lasts until a stable demand is realized for the firms from country 1. 
Then it turns to New SPNE, ((Policy mode is Direct quantity control, Policy mode Direct 
quantity control), ( **1q ,
**
2q ), ( 1θ  and 2θ  are revealed, and 1( )Var θ and 








2. Asymmetric case (the number of firms from country 2 is greater than the number of 
firms from country 1, 2 1N N> ) 
 
In this case, a stable demand for the firms from country 1 should be realized earlier than 
country 2. There are also two different stages, Initial stage and Stage One, by the timing of 
a stable demand for country 1.  
 
 
1) Stage One 
 
Government 1 spends nothing for infrastructure since a stable demand for firms from 
country 1 was already realized in the past. However, a stable demand for the other country 
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is still in a process so government 2 spends for infrastructure. In this stage, total social 
benefits for both countries can be found as below.  
 
First, government 1 would consider two different instant social benefits ** *1 1 2( , )E q sπ and 
** **
1 1 2( , )E q qπ by the timing 2τ to calculate its overall social welfare as below. 
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The integral above actually represents its own expected discounted social benefit after 
government 1 stabilizes demand for its own domestic firms and can be solved as follows 
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Similarly, government 2 can find total social benefit as below. From government 2’s 
perspective, its own demand stability would be realized no earlier than government 1’s. 
After government 1’s demand stability at 1τ , government 2’s expected discounted social 
benefit can be found by the integral as below.  
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2) Initial Stage 
 
As explained before, there two demand variability by different countries. Each government 
can reduce its own demand variability by expenditure for infrastructure. Two different 
governments would stabilize their demand variability at a different time. If government 1 
successfully reduces the variance arising for the country 1 earlier than government 2 then 
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That is, government 2 still tries to reduce the variance arising for the country 2 after 
government 1 already has demand stability. By the randomly distributed timing 1τ , 
government 1 chooses **1q while the rival chooses 
*
2s . Later on, government 2 would 
succeed in stabilizing its individual market demand by 2τ . It means that government 1’s 
total expected social welfare will be changed from ** *1 1 2( , )E q sπ  to 
** **
1 1 2( , )E q qπ  by 
the timing 2τ .  
 
 
So, government 1’s total expected discounted social welfare is derived as below.  
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Eventually, government 2’s total expected discounted social welfare is found as follows.  
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Both governments’ total expected discounted social benefits are actually functions of 
instant success rates, which depends on expenditures for infrastructure. To find the Nash 
Equilibrium ( )* *1 2,g g , the first order conditions should be reconsidered.  
 
From the first order condition, 
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The equilibrium total expected discounted social benefits for both governments are follows. 
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The Nash Equilibrium tells that both firms spend a determined expenditure for every 
period however the timing of demand stability is still random. By their expenditures, the 
total social welfares would be expected.   
 
The SPNE, ((Policy mode is Subsidy, Policy mode is Subsidy), ( *1s ,
*
2s ), ( 1θ and 2θ are 
revealed), ( *1q ,
*
2q )), lasts until a stable demand is realized for the firms from country 1. 
Then it turns to New SPNE, ((Policy mode is Direct quantity control, Policy mode is 
Subsidy), ( **1q ,
*
2s ), ( 1θ and 2θ are revealed, and 1( )Var θ turns out to be sufficiently 
small), ( **1q ,
*
2q )). This SPNE lasts until a stable demand is realized for the firms from 
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country 2. Then it turns to New SPNE, ((Policy mode is Direct quantity control, Policy 
mode Direct quantity control), ( **1q ,
**
2q ), ( 1θ and 2θ are revealed, and 2( )Var θ turns out 
to be sufficiently small), ( **1q ,
**




The argument has been centered on if a dominant trade policy should converge to a direct 
quantity control under infinite horizon. The answer was ‘yes’ because a government has a 
vision to improve total social benefit for infinite horizon and might be ready to take a loss 
of total social benefit occurring from a reduction of a subsidy for some periods. As a result, 
the demand variability is successively reduced while the firms from the other country still 
struggle with large demand variability. Under a government-led effort to remove the 
market variance, government 1 has a dominant policy of direct quantity control. The rival 
government still chooses a subsidy as dominant policy since the demand variability for its 
domestic exporters are unchanged. Under the new dominant equilibrium policies, the total 
expected discounted social benefits for country 1 and country 2 can be compared. Unlike 
country 1, country 2 has large uncertainty for its total expected discounted social benefit. 
In the sense of less uncertainty, the total social benefit for country 1 is more efficient.  
 
If both governments involve in the removal of market variance, there would be two 
different cases, the symmetry and the asymmetry. In the symmetric case, both firms have 
equal number of firms in a market. Intuitively, both governments have the same choices 
under the identical circumstances. Thus, stable demands for all the firms coincidentally 
happen regardless the origins. In this case, the dominant equilibrium trade policy changes 
from (subsidy, subsidy) to (direct quantity control, direct quantity control). The total 
expected discounted social benefits for both governments can be found in this sense. They 
are actually equal.   
 
In the asymmetric case, each country has different number of firms operating in a market. 
For example, if country 2 has larger number of firms than country 1 then it would take 
more time for government 2 to stabilize demand for all the firms. Accordingly, government 
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2 successively stabilizes the demands for its own domestic exporter after government 1 
succeeded. In this situation, the total expected discounted social benefits for both 
governments can be obtained. Unlike the symmetric case, the dominant equilibrium trade 
policy changes from (subsidy, subsidy) to (direct quantity control, subsidy). Depending on 
government 2’s expenditure for infrastructure, the equilibrium changes to (direct quantity 
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